Speech made at Wilton Park
Conference on Conventional arms control and
the Euro-Atlantic security environment
12/10/2012
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Suspension of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in 2007 was perceived by many as Moscow’s warning and proof of worsening relations between the Kremlin and NATO. CFE was one of the most significant arms control agreements of the Cold War era and widely considered to be the cornerstone of European security. Therefore, its suspension by Russian Federation meant that something fundamental was about to change in world affairs. Russia was becoming more assertive in international affairs and CFE represented a burden to it.
Before going into a discussion on whether and how the arms control measures can affect the security situation in the region, we need to have a short look at recent history.
CFE was created to prevent either
of the Cold War blocks from amassing forces for a blitzkrieg-type offensive.
After the breakup of the Soviet Union, in 1999, the treaty was revised to
reflect geopolitical changes of the Eurasian continent. Russia was weak both in
political and economic terms, recent economic crisis was still simmering the
country and it was Moscow’s perspective that CFE could play the role of a
guarantor of external security and thus be beneficial for them. Western aid to
restore the economy was also no less significant for Moscow and these are the
reasons why Russians promptly ratified the treaty. But of course, they never
thought of fulfilling their own obligations.
Because NATO countries refused to ratify the adapted treaty unless Russia meets the limits and removes forces from Georgia and Moldova, in 2002, Russia declared that it now effectively meets the weapons limits. On NATO reminder that Moscow still had to remove forces from Georgia and Moldova, Moscow referred to new members of the Alliance which were not parts of the treaty and for these members to join the CFE, it should first enter into force.
NATO countries remained firm about the Russian removal of forces from Georgia and Moldova, and this stalemate continued for about five years. It finally played on Russian benefit when in 2007, the Kremlin declared its decision to suspend CFE. Delay of ratification by NATO partners was given an official reason for such a move but the reality was that Russia became suspicious of the USA’s rotational military units in Romania and Bulgaria and Russian forces’ involuntary departure from Georgia, and thus wanted to retaliate.
It is noteworthy that these events
coincided with the last Russian soldier leaving Georgia. For Georgians, CFE
suspension sounded a declaration of Russian comeback in the region, and this
really happened in just one year – with the war with Georgia in 2008.
***
An utter fact of suspension of the treaty before re-amassing its forces in Georgia and its neighboring regions shows how important the treaty is in terms of the prevention of large-scale armed conflict. Today, there is no control on Russian build-up of the forces in the North Caucasus, and Georgia’s South Ossetia and Abkhazia; there is no legal instrument that would prevent this.
Russia not only stationed its forces in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and has built new military bases in these regions, but they also continue to accumulate forces along the northern border with Georgia. One such relatively small military base is built in so-called Sev-Priyut (near Georgian Kodori Gorge); another one – in Verkhni Baksan (near Georgia’s Svaneti region), in Vladikavkaz (near Kazbegi), in Itum-Kale (near Georgia’s Shatili village), and in Beshtash (near Kvareli). Larger forces include Russia’s 4th and 7th military bases in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, respectively. In these bases, famous Russian S300 Air Defense Missile Systems are located, and Russia deems these two bases as its two main fortifications in the southern direction. To put it simply, Moscow is ready for another war let just strategic situation permit.
Overall, there is, of course, no assurance between Georgia and Russia. And this is no surprise after numerous provocations followed by war, and declaration of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, the buildup of troops and weapons in these regions, smuggling, trafficking, illegal drugs and arms trade that pose additional threats to the welfare and development of Georgian state.
On the other hand, Russia is not simply suspicious of Georgia’s decision to join NATO, but they think prevention of this happening is a matter of very important, if not vital, interest of Moscow. Even today, when Russia effectively managed to prevent diversification of European energy markets though trans-Caspian communications, and made them vastly dependent on Russian oil and gas, South Caucasus still maintains huge significance for the Kremlin. First of all, they have the work to finalize in Georgia. Moscow needs firm guarantees that Georgia will not join NATO in the future, thus creating favorable conditions for the growth of the Kremlin’s influence further to the South. It is credible that Russia will attempt to legalize their presence in Georgia’s breakaway regions and will seek for more than just mutual agreements with these puppet governments. Having effective CAC agreements would, of course, create firm guarantees to prevent such attempts.
We also know Russia’s strategic flirt with Iran, division of interests with Turkey, importance of Black Sea for Russia, importance of control of the trans-Caspian corridor, etc. Will Moscow want to revitalize the treaty which they did everything to kill? In which circumstances would they want this? These are very hard questions to address.
CFE treaty, Vienna Document and Open Skies Agreement were designed to increase trust and enhance security and stability on the European continent. CFE was adapted to reflect emergence of new independent states and respective new strategic realities of the continent, but in Moscow’s eyes, it has remained the NATO – Russia industry.
Treaties work when their signatories want to see them work. With respect of the mentioned documents, it is no longer the case today. Russia is clearly against Conventional Arms Control measures and the United States and United Kingdom managed to retaliate by just parallel suspension of CFE obligations vis-à-vis Russia. So far, this move has not proved itself as sufficient in terms of forcing Russia back into the treaty. We are all in stalemate because European nations are more concerned by Russia’s “free hand” than Russia is by US and UK retaliatory move. Today, unfortunately no clear incentives are visible that would change Moscow’s stance in this regard.
Thus, as recent historical background has proved, the only effective measure that can generate Moscow’s interest toward the CFE or other arms control measures, is a possible change of military balance around its borders. Future of US military partnership with eastern European countries, the future of US ABM systems on European continent, a pace of military development of Russia’s neighboring countries – seem today the only criteria that can trigger the Kremlin’s interest toward Conventional arms control measures. Russia is on the move and they don’t think of defensive measures. During the last few years, military balance of the region is constantly shifting to favor Moscow’s hard power interests.
As it was mentioned above, the measures themselves have proved effective in the past and, if enforced, they can continue to positively influence the security situation in the region. The problem is that there is a lack of consensus and common vision between the most significant players of the security architecture of the continent. For example, instead of parallel suspension of the treaty, maybe it’s a better move to enable the new members of the Alliance to join the Treaty and thus eliminate some of Moscow’s most significant arguments against the Treaty.
Because, it is true that conventional arms control measures are excellent technical tools for improving the security situation in the region. Transparency in military force building is, of course, key to mutual confidence building between Russia and Georgia, including with the conflict regions of Georgia and the region as a whole. There are too many fairy tales told to war - torn populations during these last years, and they have no tools to visualize the reality. On the other hand, Russia has raised concerns regarding alleged military buildup in Georgia, and of course, it is in Tbilisi’s best interest to have Russian force movements under some control. Revitalization of the Treaty should benefit all parties and I strongly believe that keeping the military balance in the region, and keeping that balance transparent will much benefit the security situation. Unfortunately, in current situation, this is not the most realistic scenario. The worst situation is, of course, in Abkhazia and South Ossetia which are security white spots. By declaring them independent, Russia pulled these territories out of any legal responsibility and made them directly dependent black holes of security. This situation cannot continue and need to be changed.
To finalize, I think it is very clear that on one hand, conventional arms control measures can be technically very effective mechanisms for confidence building, but at the same time, strategic situation makes them today obsolete. In this situation, the only way out of this stalemate can be wise concessions and renewed consultations that would take into account new realities; occupied regions should be included into the area of CFE application under Russian quota – because Russia is a de facto owner of these forces, and gradual ratifications of the Adapted CFE may also start. This is the situation when we know what to do; we just need to figure out – how. It is my perspective that although the renewal of consultations is clearly the first step, it is true strategic thinking and grand strategic decisions that will decide the prospects of security of the region and the continent as a whole.
Andro Barnovi
Comments